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BETWEEN 
AVANT-GARDE 
AND KITSCH: 
DECONSTRUCTING 
ART AND/AS 
IDEOLOGY
Colin Gardner
Art and Politics: Between Purity 
and Propaganda by Joes Segal. 
Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2016. Pp. 176, 30 
illustrations. $18.99 paper.
In a now infamous speech to the 
US House of Representatives on 
August 16, 1949, Congressman 
George Dondero (Republican from 
Michigan) railed against modern 
art, particularly abstraction, as a 
communist threat to true American 
values. “What are these isms that 
are the very foundation of so-called 
modern art?” he asked. “I call the 
roll of infamy without claim that 
my list is all-inclusive: dadaism, 
futurism, constructionism, supre-
matism, cubism, expressionism, 
surrealism, and abstractionism. 
All these isms are of foreign ori-
gin, and truly should have no place 
in American art. While not all are 
media of social or political protest, 
all are instruments and weapons 
of destruction. . . .”1 Meanwhile, 
working covertly and indepen-
dently of Congress and using secret 
funding provided by a number 
of CIA front organizations (most 
notably the Congress of Cultural 
Freedom under the leadership of 
Michael Josselson), these so-called 
“weapons of destruction”—spe-
cifically Abstract Expressionism—
were being harnessed by the United 
States Information Agency (USIA) 
as the epitome of American free-
dom of expression against totalitar-
ian Soviet state propaganda and its 
officially sanctioned artistic style, 
socialist realism. The innate con-
tradictions of art’s role in the Cold 
War context—modernism as both 
quintessentially American and sub-
versively communist—are further 
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complicated when one considers 
Clement Greenberg’s distinction 
between avant-garde and kitsch in 
his eponymous 1939 essay in which 
he lionizes abstract painting as the 
ultimate realization of modern art’s 
historical mission—i.e., absolute 
artistic purity whereby, following 
the tenets of Gotthold Lessing’s 
Laocoön (1766), painting can only 
be about painting as the subject of 
its own innate process.2 Work with 
an overt political or social mes-
sage cannot be considered art but 
is instead kitsch or propaganda, 
which, drawing upon the simula-
crum of genuine culture, merely 
imitates art’s effects. In Greenberg’s 
eyes, the latter’s cultural philis-
tinism would conveniently rel-
egate socially conscious artists such 
as Ben Shahn, Diego Rivera, and 
Philip Evergood to the same level 
as Stalinist hacks such as Isaak 
Brodsky.
Clearly, given these examples, 
any attempt to create a clear-cut 
opposition between “political” 
or “activist” art on the one hand 
(Greenberg’s kitsch) and “purely 
autonomous” art on the other 
(Greenberg’s avant-garde) is not 
only spurious but also irresponsi-
bly unhistorical. In his brilliantly 
incisive new book, Art and Politics: 
Between Purity and Propaganda, 
Joes Segal sets out to deconstruct 
this false binary by showing that 
“politicians and government agen-
cies may project their own ideas, 
interests and fears on artworks. 
This is due to the fact that the visual 
arts cannot easily be reduced to 
unambiguous statements or clear-
cut arguments” (8). In contrast, he 
argues, the political meaning of art 
“is in no way restricted to artworks 
with a declared political intention. 
The most interesting cases tend to 
be those works which at first sight 
are politically ambiguous or have 
no political meaning at all” (9). In 
short, “In this collection of essays I 
use another perspective by analyz-
ing the political implications of the 
very idea of a pure and apolitical 
modern art” (9).
Using a carefully considered case 
study approach, Segal traces the 
ambivalent relationship between 
art and politics over a hundred-year 
span from 1914 to 2014. Obviously, 
given the book’s limited length (a 
very tight 136 pages of text), Segal has 
been highly selective and acknowl-
edges some key omissions: the 
relationship of Futurism to Italian 
Fascism; art during the Spanish 
Civil War (Picasso’s Guernica is 
thus conspicuously absent); the clash 
between modern, socialist, and reli-
gious imagery in 1970s Iran; the 
competing art traditions in North 
and South Korea; as well as issues 
of identity in post-apartheid South 
Africa. Nonetheless, his choices raise 
enough key points that they can be 
easily cross-referenced into other 
artistic and nationalist contexts, both 
within and outside the confines of 
the book. Thus Segal covers a wide 
range of nationalist paradigms, 
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including the public debates on 
art and identity in France and 
Germany during World War I; the 
false dichotomy between national 
and international “degenerate” art 
under the Third Reich; the shifting 
sands of communist propaganda in 
the Soviet bloc and China; as well 
as the individual, aporetic careers of 
Diego Rivera in Mexico and the US 
and Kara Walker’s brave attempts 
to carve out her own critical space 
between the “white” cultural master 
narrative (where she is dismissed by 
establishment critics such as Donald 
Kuspit as “an ideological failure and 
intellectually inadequate” [106]) and 
the “black” counter-narrative that 
accuses her of selling out to the dom-
inant art market, a passive inocula-
tion “passing” as cultural difference.
In each of the book’s seven 
chapters Segal explores four lev-
els of fluidly intertwined and often 
mutually contradictory levels of 
political meaning: (1) artistic inten-
tion, (2) critical reception, (3) his-
torical contextualization, and (4) 
political use or abuse (10). Perhaps 
the most insightful chapter is Segal’s 
opening survey of “Positive and 
Negative Integration” in France 
and Germany during World War 
I, which discloses some surprisingly 
narrow nationalist currents that cut 
across established art historical dis-
course and traditional aesthetic lines, 
laying much of the groundwork 
for the subsequent Nazi demoni-
zation of “degenerate” art in the 
1930s. In both countries the war was 
embraced as a “blood sacrifice,” a 
necessary redemption from a state of 
cultural decadence, a form of puri-
fication and hygienic healing tied 
to an upsurge in deeply entrenched 
national values. Led by the rhe-
torical discourses of playwright and 
art critic, Hermann Bahr, and the 
painter, Franz Marc, art was no lon-
ger evaluated through trans-national 
aesthetic movements and styles 
such as Cubism, Impressionism, or 
Expressionism but on strictly “us vs. 
them” national lines, epitomized by 
Emperor Wilhelm II’s Burgfrieden 
(castle truce) and French President 
Raymond Poincarés union sacrée 
(holy unity). Thus all art came to 
be situated within strictly national-
ist traditions, and artists were quick 
to reject any so-called “colleagues” 
who deviated from this prescribed 
position, even if they were fellow 
Expressionists or Impressionists. 
Indeed, the latter were often dis-
missed as “internationalist” and thus 
beneath contempt. As Segal suc-
cinctly puts it, “Art history and art 
criticism had swapped the domain 
of aesthetic judgments for the 
domain of artistic treason” (26). In 
other words, aesthetics had become 
a matter of survival against rabid 
infection.
To give a typical example, the 
French art historian Ēmile Mâle 
claimed the Germans had no claim 
to anything of cultural importance 
(including Gothic architecture) and 
their sole source of expression was 
destroying other people’s culture 
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(epitomized by the German bom-
bardment of Reims Cathedral, 
the apotheosis of French Gothic, 
which was quickly condemned as 
cultural barbarism by the French). 
In response, the German histo-
rian Cornelius Gurlitt argued that 
Gothic was produced solely by 
German elites in both France and 
Germany. The inferior Celts had 
guillotined these elites during the 
French Revolution, thus explaining 
the dearth of culture in France ever 
since. Kurt Engelbrecht went even 
further, proclaiming that all artistic 
creativity was exclusively German: 
great artists such as Dante or 
Michelangelo were explained away 
through their “obvious German 
descent.”
As one might expect, this fanati-
cal national binarism didn’t last 
long, not only due to the disillusion 
and cynicism wrought by the hor-
ror of modern warfare itself but 
also because “the moment artists 
and critics started to define artistic 
unity in more specific terms, ten-
sions arose” (24). Thus French art 
critics condemned Cubism as a 
German-Jewish conspiracy, despite 
the fact that its leading expo-
nents were Spanish (Picasso) and 
French (Braque). For their part, the 
Germans targeted the Expressionists 
and Impressionists—especially the 
leading German Impressionist, 
Max Liebermann (who was Jewish 
and thus “not really German”). 
Clearly, despite Greenberg’s revi-
sionist arguments to the contrary 
throughout the 1940s and ’50s, the 
idea of an internationalist, “immac-
ulately” autonomous avant-garde is 
a myth, because national interests, 
at least for the duration of the war, 
trumped the transcendental value of 
aesthetic style. As Segal explains, “It 
is a mistake to conclude that because 
conservatives, nationalists, fascists, 
national-socialists and communists 
all hated modern art during large 
parts of the twentieth century, mod-
ern artists themselves were immune 
to ideological temptations” (29).
Interestingly, in his analysis of 
art and politics during the Third 
Reich, Segal notes that style (rather 
than concrete issues such as race 
and national identity) started to 
play a key role in both the definition 
and distinction between national 
and degenerate art. The common 
wisdom follows the curatorial tem-
plate laid down by the two 1937 
Munich exhibitions organized by 
Adolf Ziegler, President of Reich 
Chamber of the Visual Arts.
“The First Great German Art 
Exhibition,” staged in the House 
of German Art, showcased works 
approved by the regime, while the 
“Entartete Kunst Exhibition” in 
the Hofgartenarkaden, highlighted 
so-called degenerate (read: interna-
tionalist or Jewish) art, which was 
almost exclusively modernist in 
style. Approved art followed the 
basic criteria laid down by Hitler 
in Mein Kampf, that “art is a direct 
expression of a nation, and can 
therefore only be understood and 
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valued by the people of that nation. 
‘Modern art’ was to him a contra-
diction in terms, because true art 
is a timeless part of the universal 
essence of the people” (49). Hitler’s 
objective was to create a clear-cut 
political divide by creating a collec-
tive enemy that could be “othered” 
on both racial and political grounds. 
While true art is easily recognizable 
by the masses, modern art was elit-
ist and difficult to understand, and 
it was therefore easily exposed as 
fraudulent.
However, as Segal explains in 
some detail, the binary opposition 
between national and modern art 
was not as decisive as it seemed. 
Thus the German Expressionists 
actually had right-wing advo-
cates, most notably Otto Schreiber, 
President of the National Socialist 
German Student League, who 
organized the 1933 exhibition in 
Berlin that included works by 
Franz Marc, August Macke, Ernst 
Barlach, Erich Heckel, and Emil 
Nolde. Indeed, Goebbels himself 
also supported the Expressionists 
in the early years of the Reich and 
collected both Barlach and Nolde. 
In turn, not all the Expressionists 
were against the new regime: 
Barlach, Heckel, Nolde and Mies 
van der Rohe all signed a call for 
support of the Nazi government 
and its leaders.
Nolde was easily the most 
extreme case, having criticized 
the destructive role of Jews in 
German art prior to the War, and 
he became an early member of the 
NSDAP, joining the party in the 
early 1920s. Indeed, in his 1934 
autobiography, Years of Struggle, 
1902–14, he called modern artists 
“Half-bloods, bastards and mulat-
toes” (52) (conveniently excluding 
himself, of course). That Nolde 
was represented by twenty-seven 
works in the Degenerate Art 
Exhibition suggests that his pres-
ence was largely based on stylistic 
issues rather than his actual politi-
cal loyalties. In addition, only two 
artists in the Degenerate show 
were actually Jewish—Ludwig 
Meidner and Otto Freundlich—
while Rodolf Belling had work 
in both exhibitions. Segal’s logi-
cal conclusion is that “the struggle 
against Jewish and Bolshevist art 
was in fact not a struggle against 
Jewish and Bolshevist artists. 
Artistic style defined whether an 
artist was deemed degenerate, and 
thus Jewish and/or Bolshevist. In 
the meantime, not all Nazi leaders 
shared the official criticism of mod-
ern art and not all modern artists 
disagreed with the political ideas of 
National Socialism” (58).
Segal’s chapters on the Mexican 
muralist Diego Rivera and the 
African-American artist Kara 
Walker provide contrasting yet 
complementary views of how artis-
tic intention can come into an often 
irresolvable dialectic with critical 
reception and political co-option. 
As is well documented, Rivera 
had bona fide leftist credentials. A 
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close friend of Trotsky, from 1922 
until his expulsion in 1929 he was 
a member of the PCM (Partido 
Comunista Mexicano) and briefly 
joined the Soviet art group, October 
during a 1927–28 visit to Russia 
before being expelled for “counter-
revolutionary activities.” Yet for 
most of his career Rivera lived on 
commissions from a succession of 
anti-communist Mexican govern-
ments and American capitalists, 
most notably Edsel Ford (for his 
murals at the Detroit Institute of 
Art) and Nelson Rockefeller (for 
Rockefeller Center in New York). 
As a member of the socialist art-
ists union, Sindicato de Obreros 
Técnicos, Pintores y Ecultores, 
whose manifesto was written by 
the would-be Trotsky assassin, 
David Alfaro Siqueiros, Rivera 
worked under the strict proviso 
that no commissions should be 
accepted for private collections and 
museums and that all projects must 
reach the wider community in 
public spaces. Artists were deemed 
to be workers and must only earn 
an average worker’s salary. Caught 
between his commitment to radical 
social content and reliance on capi-
talist largesse, “Rivera thus came 
under attack from two sides: while 
conservative critics viewed him as 
a dangerous left-wing demagogue, 
many communists considered him 
mendacious and bourgeois” (35).
For Segal, Rivera is a prime 
example of an artist who believed 
that art could be meaningful to 
the proletariat even if paid for by 
capitalists. As he argues, “Rivera 
had a fascination for modern tech-
nology and industry, and believed 
that the machine would eventu-
ally contribute to the realization of 
a classless society. His frescoes for 
Ford and Rockfeller attest to this 
expectation” (40). Consequently, 
each of Rivera’s murals needs to be 
evaluated according to its specific 
historical circumstances. Thus, 
although the Detroit murals feature 
workers, engineers, and busines-
sowners working together for com-
mon interest, this somewhat “pie in 
the sky” approach led to attacks 
from left-wing critics who saw a 
blatant disregard for workers’ mis-
ery following the Wall Street Crash. 
Indeed, only a few weeks before 
Rivera started work, five protesting 
workers were killed by the police 
during a Communist Party dem-
onstration against the Ford factory. 
In contrast, Rivera’s epic mural at 
Rockefeller Center—Man at the 
Crossroads Looking with Hope and 
High Vision to the Choosing of a 
New and Better Future (1933)—
was quickly destroyed when Rivera 
refused to compromise over his 
inclusion of Lenin, depicted hold-
ing hands with a Russian soldier 
and an African-American worker. 
Rivera’s entire career was thus a 
history of incongruities, an attempt 
to make revolutionary art for con-
servative patrons, sometimes com-
promising (Detroit), sometimes not 
(New York).
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Eschewing Greenbergian for-
malism in favor of a return to art’s 
storytelling function or fabulation, 
Kara Walker’s silhouettes refer-
ence American slave history as a 
means of constructing a collective 
memory (what Gilles Deleuze calls 
“a people to come”) outside of the 
master narrative of both main-
stream (read: Eurocentric) history 
and the art historical canon. This 
counter-cultural tactic is faced with 
a number of pitfalls, succinctly 
noted by Lucy Lippard: minority 
artists can either comply with the 
demands of mainstream art, shake 
off their provincialism and join 
the cultural elite, or dismiss offi-
cial art’s universalist claims and be 
pressured by their own community 
to conform to a static normative 
cultural identity. The problem is 
finding a middle ground between 
the two, which Walker achieves 
by widening the gap between 
story and reality through the jum-
bling of stereotypes, all the better 
to allow the spectator to construct 
their own ideological reading by 
projecting their own views (and 
identities) into the voids of her 
silhouettes. As Segal argues, “She 
does not literally illustrate his-
tory but creates a parallel world 
in which masters and slaves are 
engaged in an ever-changing 
continuum of domination and 
submission, aggression and love, 
destruction and desire” (103).
Although this has led to unsur-
prising critique from conservative 
critics such as Donald Kuspit—
the work is filled with “black 
rage, resentment and bitterness” 
(106)—the most vicious attacks 
have come from within Walker’s 
own community. Thus in the 
summer of 1997, black artist Betye 
Saar sent over 200 letters to artists, 
writers, and politicians, urging 
them to keep Walker’s work out 
of US museums, accusing her of 
betraying her slave subjects and 
selling out to the white art estab-
lishment. Similarly, Michael D. 
Harris accused Walker of suffer-
ing from Stockholm syndrome—
she continually re-enacts the 
subjugation of African Americans 
under slavery to the point that we 
no longer need the Ku Klux Klan 
as a white supremacist watchdog. 
Although Segal doesn’t mention 
Homi Bhabha’s writings on ste-
reotyping, they are clearly rel-
evant here, as they disclose the 
ambivalent nature of Walker’s 
images, caught between fetishism 
and the Imaginary, between asser-
tion and anxiety, between what is 
already known and accepted but 
also what needs to be constantly 
reasserted (the connections to 
castration anxiety are obvious). 
As Henry Louis Gates Jr. rightly 
states, Walker appropriates ste-
reotypes to free “our people from 
[the] residual, debilitating effects 
that the proliferation of those 
images undoubtedly has had upon 
the collective unconscious of the 
African American people” (108).
130 COLIN GARDNER
Criticism 60.1_06_Gardner.indd Page 130 21/12/18  5:23 PM
Finally, Segal discusses the 
shifting terrain of art produced 
under communist China and the 
Soviet bloc countries in Eastern 
Europe, both before and after 
the break-up of the USSR. Until 
the liberal de-Stalinization under 
Khruschev led to an erosion of 
socialist realism in favor of inter-
national influences, especially Pop 
Art and conceptualism, Soviet cul-
tural affairs during the Cold War 
were firmly controlled by the iron 
rule of Andrei Zhdanov, who con-
tinued the promotion of the official 
style by reinstalling the Tsarist art 
academy and promoting four basic 
decrees: against the lack of ideol-
ogy in Soviet literature, bourgeois 
decadent influences in theater, false 
originality in music, and degener-
ate characters in film, which led to 
the public condemnation of lead-
ing Soviet artists such as Sergei 
Eisenstein, Sergey Prokofiev, and 
Dimitri Shostakovich. However, as 
in the cases outlined above, this was 
not strictly enforced. For example, 
Picasso (a member of the French 
Communist Party from 1944) was 
a key target of Soviet art criticism 
(his formalism typified the deca-
dence of late capitalism), yet at the 
Paris Peace Conference of 1949, his 
peace dove design earned him the 
Stalin Peace Prize the following 
year. Thus, “in the international 
arena, the very symbol of Western 
cultural decadence was celebrated 
as an exemplary communist 
artist”(68).
At first glance, Maoist China 
seems even more rigid in its 
approach to anti-bourgeois ten-
dencies in politics and culture. 
Although in 1956, Prime Minister 
Zhou Enlai launched “Let a 
Hundred Flowers Bloom”—a 
year long period of relaxation and 
liberalization in the arts whereby 
practitioners were encouraged to 
experiment and learn from dif-
ferent artistic traditions lead-
ing to exhibitions featuring art 
from Europe (including Matisse 
and Picasso), Mexico, Japan, and 
Vietnam—it was quickly followed 
by Mao’s savage backlash, the 
“Anti-Rightist Campaign” against 
bourgeois influences and those who 
criticized the Communist Party the 
year before. Indeed, as Segal points 
out, “Without a doubt, the most 
cynical aspect of the Anti-Rightist 
Campaign was the stipulation that 
all societal organizations—facto-
ries, collective farms, universities, 
art academies, etc.—had to iden-
tify 5 percent of their members 
as counter-revolutionaries. The 
subsequent disciplinary measures 
affected hundreds of thousands of 
artists and intellectuals” (82).
It was only after Mao’s death 
that the official tropes of the 
leader’s personality cult and 
the endless reproductions of his 
image—where an appropria-
tion or subversion of his likeness 
could be seen as an act of sacri-
lege—were finally turned on their 
head, in much the same way that 
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Warhol’s silkscreens of Mao could 
be seen as the representation of a 
pop icon and his official branding 
as a commercial commodity. Thus 
former Red Guard Wang Keping 
gave Mao the Buddha’s round 
cheeks in his sculpture, Idol, while 
Li Shan turned Mao into androgy-
nous figure with colored lips and 
eyebrows. Wang Guangyi placed 
him behind a grid evoking prison 
bars, Gao Qiang had him swim-
ming in a red-colored (bloody) 
Yangtze River, and Sui Jianguo 
created a series of “empty” Mao 
jackets—as if to show that a once 
potent political and cultural sym-
bol had now become a vacuous 
and hollow shell.
It is this “heavy heritage” turned 
into an empty signifier that is the 
subject of Segal’s fascinating final 
chapter, which deals with the fate 
of public monuments in the former 
Soviet bloc following the numer-
ous regime changes from 1989–91. 
“What happened to these monu-
ments,” asks Segal, “how did their 
meaning change in a completely 
different political environment, 
which monuments were destroyed, 
what came in their place?” (14). 
Also, what do the changes tell us 
about the construction of new col-
lective identities?
Although Robert Musil once 
stated that “nothing is as invisible as 
a public monument” (111), this is no 
longer true after a regime change. 
To give a couple of examples, in 
1970, Lenin Square in East Berlin 
received the gift of a sixty-foot-high 
sculpture of the Soviet leader by the 
Russian sculptor Nikolai Tomsky. 
In 1991, following the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, the borough council 
voted for its removal. It was cut 
into 129 pieces and buried in a sand 
grove in Berlin’s Müggelheim dis-
trict. This led to fierce protests from 
some of the local population, not 
because they valued the statue per 
se but because they wanted a voice 
(and public debate) in the appropri-
ate handling of the newly unified 
country’s East German heritage, 
as if to recognize that public space 
in a reunited Germany belongs to 
the people as a form of transver-
sal, stratigraphic history rather 
than the upholding of a static sta-
tus quo. For Segal, monuments are 
the public art form par excellence: 
they construct a canon of collective 
memory—timeless and univer-
sal—defying changes in regimes 
and generations.
In addition, monuments aid in 
the invention of tradition, a back-
wards construction of historical 
continuity (however fictitious) even 
though the symbols are brand new. 
“In a somewhat broader defini-
tion,” argues Segal, “the term can 
also be applied to attempts to erase 
historical contingencies, disconti-
nuities and ruptures from collective 
memory in order to replace them 
with a story of unbroken national 
continuity and progress” (120). For 
example, after Macedonia gained 
independence from Yugoslavia, 
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its quest for a national symbol led 
to an international dispute with 
Greece over their right to erect 
an equestrian statue of Alexander 
the Great in Skopje as a symbol 
of national identity. Because the 
Greeks had their own province of 
Macedonia, they not only refused 
to recognize their neighbor’s right 
to the name, they also rejected any 
attempt to share “their” Alexander 
with the “Slavic” Macedonians. 
The fact that neither country can be 
traced directly back to Alexander 
as a “founding father” was deemed 
irrelevant.
While this might seem to be 
a preposterous storm in a tea-
cup, a case of identity national-
ism gone mad, it is a measure of 
the importance of Segal’s book 
that such examples can also be 
fruitfully applied outside their 
specific content. For example, 
the August 11, 2017, “Unite the 
Right” Emancipation Park riots 
in Charlottesville, Virginia, under-
line the importance of historical 
symbolism as a determining factor 
in bolstering an otherwise wan-
ing national-racial identity. In this 
case, neo-Nazi White Nationalists 
descended on the liberal col-
lege town to protest the proposed 
removal of two symbols of the 
Confederacy (and by extension, 
slavery): an equestrian statute of 
General Robert E. Lee and one of 
Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson. In 
addition to vociferous anti-fascist 
counterprotests, which led to the 
tragic death of Heather Heyer near 
the downtown pedestrian mall, the 
event raised a series of questions. 
Firstly, we have the shameful inap-
propriateness of President Trump’s 
remarks, whereby he lumped 
together the neo-Nazi instigators 
with anti-Nazi counter demon-
strators by denouncing violence 
“on all sides.” Secondly, the event 
showcased the problem of how to 
deal with “unpopular” cultural 
symbols in the wake of long-term 
progressive changes in political 
consciousness. Should the statues 
be preserved as a key (albeit unsa-
vory) part of the South’s histori-
cal legacy, providing a catalyst for 
progressive discussion and debate, 
or removed as a form of “airbrush-
ing” symbols of hatred from the 
history books (which, in turn, as 
the Charlottesville riots showed us, 
might spawn even more hatred)?
As a countermeasure, let’s con-
sider the example of Monument 
Avenue in Richmond, the state cap-
ital, where similar statues have been 
preserved but also supplemented by 
significant markers of difference, 
so that African-American tennis 
legend Arthur Ashe, another of 
Richmond’s native sons, joins Lee 
and Jackson as part of a new racial 
cartography where public art plays 
a key role in re-inventing tradition 
ex-post facto, calling into question 
hitherto unchallenged political 
projections. The result is not unlike 
the pink and turquoise painted 
bust of Lenin rescued from a 1989 
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demonstration in Leipzig that is 
featured on the cover of Segal’s 
book, for as Segal concludes, “it is 
the power of art to call these projec-
tions into question. The Pink Lenin 
on the cover of this book immedi-
ately shows that the power of politi-
cians to reduce art to propaganda is 
effectively countered by the power 
of the creative individual to make 
propaganda into art again” (136).
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